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The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence
from US States
Summary
The determinants of incentive regulation are a key issue in industrial policy. I study an
asymmetric information model of incentive rules selection by a political principal
endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency increases with the
effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set up
captures the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that
reforms toward higher powered rules are more likely the more inefficient (efficient) is
the production (information-gathering) technology, the less tight is political competition
and the greater are pro-consumer supervisors’ incentives. This prediction is consistent
with evidence based on US electric power market data.
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A Francesco e Pierluigi con Amore e Profondo Rispetto.

1. Introduction
In regulating a natural monopoly with unknown costs, governments should
select incentive rules optimally trading off informational rents extraction and costsaving inducement (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Yet, politicians put a greater or
lesser weight on the firm’s profit depending on whether their constituency is
dominated by pro-shareholder or pro-consumer sentiments. Besides, the details of
incentive contracts are implemented by public officials who are accountable to
professional peers or specific groups of voters and not to the society at large.
The US electric power market (along with other US markets) is a case in
point. Major regulatory reforms, included the recent introduction of incentive
regulation, are politically initiated but subject to lengthy quasi-judicial hearings
aimed at gathering both the necessary technical information and the consensus of
all interested parties. While regulators and judges, who can either be appointed or
elected, preside over the hearings, the final policy position is proposed de facto by
an independent staff. This institutional design is not unique to the US and, in the
aftermath of the recent South-American and European privatization wave, a rising
need for higher transparency of the regulatory process has exported beyond
American boundaries a similar combination of independent staffs and accountable
top-level regulators and judges (see Newbery, 2000).1 What, therefore, are the
public officials’ incentives and task-specific motivations effectively shaping

1

A similar relation exists between the Monetary Policy Committee and the Governor of the Bank

of England and between the Monopolies and Merger Commission and the Director General of Fair
Trading. Moreover, the paper analysis applies also to procurement settings (see footnote 7).
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regulatory reforms and how do they interact with each other, the rent extractionefficiency trade off and the political environment?
To answer this question, I provide a simple theoretical framework bridging
the canonical principal-agent model of incentive regulation (Laffont, 1996) with
two recent strands of political economics literature. While the first compares
accountable and nonaccountable public agents (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007), the
second contrasts career and legacy concerns in politics (Maskin and Tirole, 2004).
Bringing together these bodies of economic theory, I study the incentive
rules selection problem performed by a principal faced with a monopoly with
unknown costs. The principal is endowed with an information-gathering
technology whose efficiency rises with the effort exerted by a regulator and a
judge, whom hereafter I will call supervisors. Supervisors respond to implicit or
accountability incentives and intrinsic or legacy motivations. Implicit incentives
force supervisors to select effort looking at the ballot box (at the preferences of
their professional peers) if elected (appointed) but not at the power–in terms of
cost-reducing effort–of the rule selected by the principal.
The model predicts that, under a mild condition on the distribution of
supervisors’ random abilities, elected supervisors exert more effort than appointed
ones. These pandering boosts are fuelled (curbed) by judges’ fairness motivations
(regulators’ desires of pursuing a future career in the industry). The principal
foresees the effect of implicit incentives and intrinsic motivations on the expected
probability of remaining uninformed, and, accordingly, the power of equilibrium
incentive rules increases (decreases) with fairness (revolving door) motivations,
and is greater when judges and regulators are elected. Moreover, if the principal is
one of two competing political parties, incentive rules become sensible to the

3
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tightness of political competition, to political preferences, and to the efficiency of
the production and information-gathering technologies.
To test this set of predictions, I analyze US electric power market data at
the state level. Consistently with the model, performance based regulation (PBR
hereafter) is found where regulators and judges are elected, judges’ fairness
motivations are stronger, political competition is less harsh, generation more
costly and regulatory resources more abundant.
There are three main contributions by this paper. First, I formalize and test
a theory of complementarities among supervisors’ implicit and firms’ explicit
incentives arising endogenously from the contractibility of the firm’s allocation as
opposed to the noncontractibility of supervisors’ performance. I also offer one of
the first accounts of the relation between public officials’ intrinsic motivations
and regulatory policies (see also Ka and Teske, 2002; Guerriero, 2008).
Second, I provide evidence that the observed regulatory institutions reflect
both efficiency and strategic political concerns. This is particularly noteworthy
because, even if several studies have used cross-state telecommunications (for
reviews see Ai and Sappington, 2002; Eckenrod, 2006) and cross-country
electricity data (for a critical review see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001) to show that
PBR can deliver lower rates and costs, and higher profits and investments, with
no relevant reduction in overall service quality, no previous paper has tried to
evaluate the determinants of reforms toward incentive regulation.2

2

Recent empirical tests look at the determinants of electricity market restructuring experiences in

the US (Ka and Teske, 2002) and around the world (Steiner, 2004) but without providing a formal
theory of regulatory actors’ incentives as derived by market institutions. Hanssen (2004) provides
a first empirical result bridging strategic dynamics and institutional reforms.

4
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Finally, I propose a first test of the endogenous effect of incentive rules on
US electric power market rates using a fixed and time effects dynamic GMM
estimator. This last exercise shows that residential rates are higher under PBR.
This evidence suggests the end of the politically-driven cross subsidies going to
residential users at the expense of business ratepayers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
institutions governing the pricing process in the US electric power market as an
example of the general setting studied in the model. The first part of section 3
clarifies the effect of supervisors’ incentives and motivations on incentive rules.
Next, the benevolence assumption is relaxed and the strategic determinants of
regulatory reforms are evaluated. Section 4 tests the model’s implications, looking
at the wave of reforms toward PBR that has interested the market in recent
decades. Section 5 concludes. All proofs, tables and a detailed description of the
data are gathered in the Appendix.

2. Institutions
Natural local monopolies and incentive rules.–– Investor-owned electric power
utilities (IOUs hereafter) account for over three-fourths of the electricity sales of
the US electricity market. While jurisdiction over both interstate transmission and
wholesale transactions lies with a federal body–the FERC, retail services are
regulated by state public utility commissions (PUCs hereafter). The latter deal
with several markets (natural gas, telecommunications, insurance, water, etc.) and
perform several tasks (for example, they suggest lines of conduct on service
provision, design environmental regulations and so on), among which price-

5
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setting is the most relevant. IOUs are not allowed to receive government subsidies
and, therefore, regulated two-part tariffs should cover average costs to assure the
firms’ viability. Accordingly, rates have traditionally been linked to realized
average costs (cost-of-service regulation). Yet, from 1982 on, incentive rules have
been applied to forty-one among the 144 major US IOUs, partially severing the
price-average costs link (Basheda et al., 2001).
Two-tier hearings and supervisors’ roles.–– Reimbursable costs and target returns
are selected during rate reviews which can be triggered by utilities in response to
cost shocks, initiated periodically by the PUC (see Friedman, 1991) or, often,
required by the state government in order to assure that a particular scheme is
implemented.3 Rate reviews follow a precise routine composed of two levels of
formal quasi-judicial hearings open to all interested parties (firms, ratepayers
along with their state-funded advocates, the PUC staff, interest groups, etc).4 First,
commissioners––the head of the PUC––sit on the bench; next, if the filing is not
approved or some party finds him/herself mistreated, a High Court judge (usually
sitting in a state supreme court) is asked to rule the case. The appeal is on law and
fact and “with so much at stake, [judicial review] is a very real possibility”
(Gormley, 1983).5
3

As Lee and Hill (1995) report, the 1995 Maine Alternative Rate Plan was introduced under the

thrust of several laws (e.g., 1988 Least-Cost planning) approved by the Republican legislature.
4

I follow Friedman (1991, pp. 92 – 98), CDRA (1992, pp. 52 – 68) and Gormley (1983, pp. 92 –

98) whose overviews are highly consistent with those available on the PUCs’ websites.
5

A huge body of press testimonies and empirical evidence highlights the critical role of judicial

review. The appellate rate of PUC decisions reached between 1974 and 1979 the mean level of
37.4 percent with a peak of 52.3 percent and a share of partially reversed cases of 43.5 percent
(Gormley, 1983). Teske et al. (2004, ch. 15) report similar figures for the 1995-1996 period.

6
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During the hearings, the role of commissioners and judges is one of
supervision. They examine witnesses and experts, receive the evidence and
interpret prevailing precedents and regulations.6 The final motion to be approved,
however, is proposed de facto by the PUC’s staff, who act as the jury in the
typical Anglo-American adversarial trial–the reason being that decisions should
always be reached in “an open and fair manner” (CDRA, 1992).7 This feature,
along with the fact that the complete record of the hearings is widely publicized
and all interested parties participate, assures that only if “hard” evidence–such
that “every interested party can convince himself that [the judgment] corresponds
to the true state of the world” (Laffont, 2000))–is obtained does the review end.
Accordingly, I set up a model in which incentive rules are selected by a
planner obtaining orthogonal and truthful signals on the firm’s technology from
the search activity of a regulator and a judge. If benevolent, the planner captures
the Coasian bargaining among interested parties necessary to implement a reform.
If partisan, a major emphasis is placed on political competition.
Supervisors’ incentives.–– Media carefully track the evolution of electricity files,
which, in turn, represent some of the most advertised performance over which
regulators and judges are selected. High–state supreme and circuit–court judges
and public utility commissioners are either elected or appointed.
6

“The judge just listens attentively. If it speaks, it will be to rule, at the request of the party or on

his own motion, on the admissibility of a question put to a witness or a party or to ensure
adherence to the rules of the game”(Zweigert and Kötz, 1998, pp. 272 – 273).
7

Commissioners consider the staff as the most influential hearing actor (Gormley, 1983; Ka and

Teske, 2002). While a part (trial staff) suggests a pre-hearing position, another (advisory staff)
proposes the final motion (CDRA, 1992). Furthermore, courts usually examine the staff before
issuing the judgement (Gormley, 1983).

7
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Coherently, I assume that supervisors are rewarded on the basis of the
extent of hard information (reported in the docket official papers) they obtain
during the hearings. Besides, I explicitly model the role of selection rules and of
regulatory and judiciary specific motivations in the pricing process.

3. Theory
The following model takes its approach from Laffont and Tirole (1993),
and incorporates a (possibly partisan) planner and two implicitly and intrinsically
motivated supervisors.

Preliminaries
Preferences and information.–– The regulated firm produces a variable scale
product q , charging a two-part tariff A  pq with q , A and p strictly positive.
The total cost is C     a  q  cq where a  0 is the manager’s effort and   0 is
an inefficiency parameter which is equal to  with probability v and to  with
probability 1  v . Define       0 . Effort a lowers the marginal cost c of a
and implies a disutility (in monetary units) for the manager of   a  with   0   0 ,
lima   a    ,    0 ,    0 and    0 (this last assumption assures that the

optimal incentive rule is deterministic).
Consumers share the same preferences, and the demand is that of a
representative consumer. Let S  q  , p  P  q   S   q  , q  D  p  and R  q   P  q  q  A
label the gross surplus, inverse and regular demand functions, and the firm’s
revenue. Consumers choose q to maximize the net surplus S  q   A  pq , and A

8
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is fixed optimally to make them indifferent between buying or not: that is, A 
S  q   P  q  q . The firm’s utility is U  t   a  , and a reservation level of 0 is

required. The firm’s revenues must cover total costs and managerial rewards t
and, thus, A   p  c  q  p   t .
The planner’s problem.–– Ex post social welfare W is the sum of the net
consumer surplus and of the firm’s utility. The firm’s budget constraint is
evaluated at the shadow price of the managerial rewards 1   and, consequently,8
W  S  q  p    A  pq  p   U  1     A   p  c  q  p   t  .

1

Let V  q  denote the social surplus brought about by the production of q . Given
that the good is private, V is the sum of the consumers’ net surplus plus the
firm’s revenue, computed at the shadow price 1   (because it helps to fulfil the
firm’s budget constraint). So, V  q    S  q   R  q    1    R  q   1    S  q  with V  0 
 0 , V   0 , V   0 , V    1   . The strictly concave objective in 1 rewrites as:

W  V  q   1       a  q   a   U .

 2

Under complete information, the planner achieves the first best allocation    a* 
 q* through a fixed price contract on t (see the Appendix). No rent is left to the

firm. Instead, under asymmetric information, the planner observes total costs and
output but not the inefficiency parameter. The planner offers the firm a menu of
incentive compatible pairs  t , c  which trade off informational rent extraction and

8

Joskow and Schmalensee (1986) suggest that A here covers a role similar to the governmental

transfers in Laffont and Tirole (1993). Thus, my analysis is formally similar to the latter when
reimbursement is intended to be operated through regulated prices. In the present case, the shadow
cost of public funds is replaced by the marginal deadweight loss from a rise in the fixed fee.

9
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allocative distortion. Let

 t , q, C, c,U , a  ,  t , q , C, c ,U , a  denote managers’ rewards,

output, total and marginal costs, utility and effort of the high and low cost (low
and high type) firms. Individual rationality and incentive compatibility imply a
binding low type’s individual rationality constraint
U  t     c   0 ,

 IR _ L 

and a binding high type’s incentive compatibility constraint
U  t     c   U     c      c     a  ,

 IC _ H 

where   a     a    a    with   0 ,   0 (because    0 ).9
Thus, under asymmetric information, expected social welfare is W 

 

v V q  1       a  q   a     a   1  v  V  q   1       a  q   a   .





 3

Except for the expected rent v  a  , the optimization is the same as in  2  . Prices
are not distorted for rent extraction, and incentive concerns are entirely taken care
of by the incentive scheme. Define   x   x 1  x  with   0 . In order to limit the
high type’s rent, the low type receives a low powered rule ( â  a* ):
   aˆ   qˆ 


1 

 .

 4

  v   aˆ

The supervision technology.––Let me now introduce two supervisors (a regulator
and a judge) who, exerting costly effort, produce two independent signals that are
observed by the planner. The signals’ precision is  l with l  R, J  . If    , with
probability  l the planner sees  and implements the full information contract

9

Incentive compatibility prescribes that the contract designed for type  (  ) is the one preferred

by type  (  ) in the menu of managerial rewards-marginal cost pairs. This amounts to saying that:
t     c   t     c 

 IC _ H 

t  (  c )  t  (  c ) .

and

 IC _ L 

10
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and with probability 1  l she observes  (that is, she remains uninformed). If,
instead,    the planner observes  always. The planner always assures a
reservation utility r to the two supervisors, who always participate in the game
and are not allowed to side contract with each other. The regulator moves first. If
the planner remains uninformed, the judge generates an orthogonal signal with the
same structure.10 Supervisors are evaluated on the observable but not contractible

 l , whose technology is multiplicative in the random (common) ability   0,1
and in the unobservable effort el  0,1 : that is, l   el .11
The parameter  is drawn from a distribution with mean  , variance  2
and density f independent of el . In order to narrow down the possible cases, I
shall focus on the class of canonical, non degenerate, continuous distributions
supported on a bounded interval and with hump-shaped density: that is, Beta,
generalized Kumaraswamy, raised cosine, inverted U-quadratic, and truncated
normal (see Johnson et al., 1994). Moreover, I shall assume that:
A1: When f is truncated normal     1                1 2 , where

 is the standard normal cumulative function.

10

This set up captures, in the case of the US electricity market, on one side, the nature of the

evidence processing (which is de facto devolved upon the staff) and, on the other, the nature of
judicial reviews (new hearings leading to de novo decisions).
11

The effort has to be considered correctly as net of all the activities intended to hide valuable

information. A multiplicative technology avoids the tiresome qualifications that an additive one
needs: the choice, however, is immaterial. If the performance is any continuous and increasing
function of the precision (e.g., expected social welfare), all the results remain unaffected.

11
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The assumption assures that, for all the distribution in the class, the
density f is not too flat at the mean, and, in particular, that f    1 . As a result,
the marginal probability of drawing a supervisor with less than average talent is
not too low. In the most sensible case, in which there are not extreme types and
f  0   f 1  0 –Beta, generalized Kumaraswamy, raised cosine, and inverted U-

quadratic–the requirement is always met (proofs available from the author).12
When, instead, this is not the case (truncated normal) the regularity on the
measure of completely skilled and unskilled types, contained in A1, is required.
Nevertheless, this last assumption has to be considered as an essentially mild one
given the high complexity and the fast changing nature of the regulation task.
Supervisors’ objective functions.–– As suggested by Maskin and Tirole (2004), I
suppose that supervisors respond to both implicit incentives and intrinsic
motivations: they not only value being in office for its own sake but they also
wish to leave a legacy. In other words, not only being reappointed or re-elected
brings valuable perquisites or satisfies tastes for influence (implicit incentives),
but supervisors want to be remembered for great things they have accomplished
in favor of the society at large, or of a part of it (intrinsic motivations). Thus, I
posit that a supervisor’s utility depends on both her identity and the degree of
accountability to which she is subjected. Therefore, a generic supervisor’s interim
(relative to the moment in which she exerts effort) utility function writes as





Ri ,l  ei ,l , S   1  1  SR  G i  ei ,l   1  1  S  J  1  K  C  ei ,l  r ,

 5

where i   A, E indexes the appointment rule to which she is subjected.
12

Some non-continuous distributions in the same class (for example, triangular) have the same

property. To be hump-shaped, the Beta and Kumaraswamy need to have parameters greater than 1.
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K   0,1 is an efficiency of the information gathering technology parameter and

the effort cost function has C  0   0 , C   0 , C   0    , C   0 , lime

i ,l 1

C   ei ,l    .

The term in square brackets represents the non-monetary bonus obtained over and
above r . Besides, the shape of the implicit rewards function G i   differentiates
appointed from elected officials and S distinguishes regulators from judges. In
particular, S is equal to 1 for a regulator and to 0 for a judge. In order to grasp a
deeper understanding of nonmonetary incentives, I shall leave aside signalling
and money-burning incentives and assume that supervisors select effort before
knowing their random ability. Then, nature chooses  . Next, the outcomes are
observed. Finally, supervisors obtain the nonmonetary rewards inclusive utility.
For what concerns implicit incentives, I embrace the distinction between
politicians and bureaucrats proposed in Alesina and Tabellini (2007): while
elected officials are held accountable by voters, at election time, appointed ones
are accountable to their professional peers or to the society for the way that they
fulfill the goals of their organization. In particular, the latter want to maximize the
conditional perception of their ability. Therefore, if E  denotes the supervisor’s
unconditional expectation over  A,l , E the evaluator’s expectation over α
conditional on  A,l and the (correct in equilibrium) evaluator’s expectation over
effort eAexp,l , then G A  eA,l   E  E   A,l , eAexp,l  . Turning to voters, they realize that the


alternative to the incumbent is an average talented official exerting effort eEexp,l . So
the incumbent is re-elected if the realized performance is greater than E ,l   eEexp,l or







.

G E  eE ,l   Pr  E ,l  E ,l  Pr    eEexp,l eE ,l 

Both the market value of talent and

office holding are normalized to 1.

13
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Turning to intrinsic motivations, J   0,1 and R   0,1 measure the
“fairness” and the “revolving door” motivations. Political and legal scholars have
assumed that judges try to make the (ex post) right decision in order to signal their
fairness and commitment. For instance, Miceli and Coşgel (1994) envision that
judges suffer a utility loss when overturned and gain utility when cited. The
disclosure of the firm’s information, instead, is less appealing for officials
attracted by future job opportunities in the industry (see also Gormley, 1983). As
Quirk (1981) shows, more pro-industry US federal regulators anticipate enhanced
chances of working for regulated firms. So I assume that the judges’ cost of
exerting effort (the regulators’ implicit rewards) decreases with J ( R ).
The timing.–– The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Society (that is, planner, supervisors and the firm) learns the nature of the
regulatory environment ( P ,   ,   ). Next, the firm discovers the value of  .
2. The planner offers the firm a menu of  t , c  pairs. If it declines, the game ends.
3. The regulator chooses her level of effort; then, she discovers the value of  .
Next, the planner receives the first signal. If this is informative the first best is
implemented. If the planner remains uninformed, the judge moves.
4. Step 3 is repeated for the judge. If the signal is uninformative, the planner asks
the firm to report its information.
5. The firm exerts equilibrium effort and the rewards-cost pair is implemented.
Next, the signals precisions are revealed and each supervisor is rewarded.
Implicit incentives build into the model a division of power structure:
officials care about their evaluators’ moves and not about the incentive scheme
selected by the planner. This model’s feature has three consequences. First,

14
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implicit incentives reduce the scope for side-contracts between the firm and the
supervisors because the former has to reimburse nonmonetary rewards to the
latter. Second, if the firm’s informational rent is not only a loss as it is in equation

 3 , supervisors’ and planner’s goals can collide. Third, the basic equilibrium can
be easily obtained solving separately the supervisors’ effort choice and the
planner’s pricing scheme selection. Before looking at the details of the first two
points, I shall illustrate the last one.

Firm’s Extrinsic Incentives vs. Supervisors’ Implicit Incentives
The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The latter can be
characterized by a tuple of equilibrium efforts (one for each possible supervisor’s
type) and a menu of  t , c  pairs contingent on the signals realizations. Proceeding
by backward induction, the solution to the supervisors’ problem implies that:
LEMMA: Label the regulators’ (judges’) selection rule with i ( j ). Each
supervisor’s problem has a unique and interior solution. In addition, equilibrium
efforts eˆi , j are such that, for all f in the class considered: (1) eˆi ,R R  0i ,
eˆ j , J J  0, j , eˆi ,l K  0i, l and eˆ j ,l K  0j, l ; (2) under A1, eˆE ,l  eˆA,l , l .

Point 1 underscores not only the role of a more efficient informationgathering technology but also the effects of opposite legacy goals: the effort
exerted by supervisors striving to please the industry (to be ex-post correct) tends
to decrease (increase) as the congruency with original tasks fades away. Even
more crucially, point 2 states that, whenever it is not too easy to substitute an
incumbent supervisor for a mean-ability one (that is, whenever A1 holds), an
elected supervisor panders to voters exerting more effort than would an appointed

15
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper193

16

Guerriero: The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Ev

one.13 Despite the different set up, the result is driven by an incentive similar to
the pandering ones identified by Maskin and Tirole (2004). Moreover, the lemma
confirms, under the more realistic asymmetric information hypothesis, the results
obtained by Besley and Coate (2003).14
At stage 2, the planner offers the firm a menu of transfers-marginal cost
pairs that are function of the expected efforts. If   i, j    eˆi ,R  1   eˆi ,R  eˆ j , J , the
planner’s posterior belief on  conditional on two uninformative signals is
Pr     ,   v 1    i, j   1  v  i, j  ,

and her optimum problem (indexed by s –that is supervision) writes as W s 

 v 1    i, j   
v  i, j W *  1  v  i, j    
V q s  1       a s  q S   a s      a s   


1

v

i
,
j





 




1 v
,
V q s  1       a s q s  a s   
 2 1    r


1  v  i, j  



 





 

where W * is the first best welfare obtained when at least one signal is informative.
The planner evaluates supervisors’ monetary perks at the shadow cost of public
funds 1   and, without loss of generality, does not value implicit incentives. All
the novelties in the optimum problem, which has a unique and positive solution,
are contained in the expected ex post probability of at least an informative signal

13

When the shape parameters equal 1, the Beta and Kumaraswamy become uniform and the

inequality holds as equality (that is, elected and appointed supervisors exert the same effort).
14

Focusing on normally distributed talent observable with noise, Alesina and Tabellini (2007)

show that a sufficiently high uncertainty over talent implies patterns opposite to those in point 2.
Yet, a similar scenario is not realistic in the present instance: regulatory policies are widely
publicized (talent observed without noise) and supervisors’ curricula vitae are consistent one with
the other (small dispersion of possible ability levels).
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  i, j  . Again, the rule giving price as a function of marginal cost is the same as

the full information case (that is, V   qˆ s   cˆ s    aˆ s ) and the planner offers the
high cost firm a scheme less powered than the first best and in particular:
   aˆ s   qˆ s 


1 

 

  v  1    i, j    aˆ s .

 6

Clearly, the hierarchical hearings structure is useful, and the allocative distortion
is partially curbed with respect the solution in  4  (i.e., aˆ  aˆ s  a* ). In
particular, given that   i, j  increases with eˆi , R , eˆ j , J , the following is true:
PROPOSITION 1: (A) The power of the optimal incentive rule rises with the
efficiency of the information-gathering technology, is increasing (decreasing)
with the strength of judges’ (regulators’) intrinsic motivations and –under A1– is
greater whenever supervisors are elected. (B) Regulated rates decrease with

aˆ s

.

The main innovation of Proposition 1 rests in underlining that supervisors’
implicit incentives and firm’s explicit incentives are complement.15 The pattern
resembles the relation between career concerns and monetary rewards in labour
contracts proposed by Gibbons and Murphy (1992). However, in contrast to the
latter, the present result refers to players who belong to different tiers of the
hierarchical structure but, yet, are linked by the revelation principle and the
division of power. When pandering incentives become more powerful–because
election is used instead of appointment–the expected probability of informative
signals increases, and the planner relaxes the allocative distortion offering the low
15

The assumption according to which the planner does not choose supervisors implicit incentives

should not strike one as unreasonable given that, over the sample considered in the empirical
section, there were only four regulatory and three judicial appointment rules reforms. Guerriero
(2008) extends the model to a world in which the planner selects the power of implicit incentives.
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type a more powerful contract. Fairness motivations reinforce complementarities;
revolving door concerns limit them.
The appeal of these results lies not only in the sensibility of the model’s
premises which bridge task-specific organizational imperatives to the asymmetry
in technological information but also in the realism of the consequences. Studying
a similar environment, the new regulatory economics (Laffont and Martimort,
1999; Laffont, 2000) obtains collusion-proof equilibria in which monetary perks
equal to the firm’s expected stake are given to explicitly interested supervisors to
avoid corruption. This pattern matches consistent evidence on regulatory reforms
(Gormley, 1983; Ka and Teske, 2002) which has clarified the narrow role of
capture but is completely at odds with any observed regulatory contract. 16 The
equilibrium discussed in Proposition 1, instead, has similar collusion-proofness
properties but builds on the observed residual rights nature of supervisors’
activities. The next section explains this point in detail.

Robustness: Lobbying and Bribery
Supervisors exert also effort in other tasks. I assume that a firms’ lobby
tries to divert supervisors’ effort from information gathering to the fulfilment of a
second task. For example, they try to avoid by-passing by non-regulated firms.
The technology of the second task is hi ,l   eih,l and its benefits are negligible for
consumers and  hi ,l (with   0 ) for the firm. Following Alesina and Tabellini

16

Collusion proof contracts are simply unrealistic if supervisors’ monetary rewards are evaluated

against the firm’s stake: over the period 1980-1997, for instance, IOUs average revenues from
retail sales were 1.94 billion dollars while the commissioners’ average salary was 59,774 dollars.

18
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2008

19

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 193 [2008]

(2008), the planner does not foresee equilibrium capture and cannot condition her
choice–that is, incentive schemes–on the supervisors’ collusive activities;  is
truncated normally distributed, and the supervisors’ effort cost function is
additive. Besides, the lobby, whose vote is irrelevant, has all the bargaining power
and, in stage 2 commit to bribes bi ,l and/or campaign contributions nE ,l (to elected
supervisors only) to be paid after stage 5 .
Both of these influence instruments are contracts contingent on the efforts
exerted in the two tasks, but bribes are illegal and, if a supervisor accepts them,
with probability   0 she is caught and pays a fine M  0 . Thus, when   0
measures the value of implicit rewards relative to illegal bribes, supervisors’
utility (indexed by C ; that is, capture) rewrites as











RiC,l (eiC,l , eih,l , S )  1   1  SR  Gi eiC,l , eih,l  1  1  S  J  1  K  C eiC,l  eih,l  r  bi ,l   M .

Implicit rewards are the same as in  5  when appointment is used but they differ
if election is employed. Indeed, campaign funds lower voters’ reservation utility
to EC,l   eEexp,l  H  nE ,l  with H  0   0 , H   0 , H   0 . The lobby’s indirect utility is







 



U  v 1   C  i, j   aˆ s ,C   E  eˆih, R  eˆhj , J   bˆi , R  bˆj , J   nˆE , R  nˆE , J  ,

where hats indicate equilibrium values. The subgame equilibrium of the menu
auction bribing game and of the lobbying game are jointly optimal for the
organized group and the supervisor, given the evaluators’ expectations. Tedious
algebra (proofs available from the author) shows that for  sufficiently large
appointed supervisors never accept bribes, and that the lobby prefers to be ex-ante
passive rather than pay bribes if the firm’s stake is too narrow or legal systems
work efficiently, that is  M is large. Strong (weak) fairness (revolving door)
motivations favor capture-free equilibria. Full-capture equilibria with positive
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campaign funds are never optimal because supervisors always lose election. Also,
the lobby is not willing to offer campaign aids if money is not very effective in
swaying votes, that is H  is small. Thus, sufficiently strong implicit incentives
and/or an inefficient corruption technology make the equilibrium in Proposition 1
endogenously collusion-proof.

Investment Concerns and Strategic Regulatory Reforms
Yet, the picture painted so far is, at least, partially incomplete: it takes into
account static dimensions of regulatory performance but it does not deal with the
impact of incentive regulation on the firm’s investment decisions. Indeed, a sharp
tension between rent extraction and investment inducement arises in industrial
policies. As shown by Laffont and Tirole (1993), whether or not the planner can
commit to reimburse investment costs, the equilibrium can envision ex post
expropriation of sunk investments. On the one hand, this dynamic inconsistency
optimally pushes toward more powerful schemes, on the other, it creates the risk
that inefficiently high or low powered incentives are imposed on the firm if
reforms are directed by political parties committed to decide in favour of their
own constituency and subject to uncertain elections.
In the next section, I first clarify the efficiency effect maintaining the
planner’s benevolence, and then I consider the positive determinants of incentive
regulation allowing for planner’s special interests. In order to illustrate the point
most clearly, I shall suppose that the planner cannot commit to reimburse
investment expenses but correctly anticipates the firm’s moves. The assumption
reflects the lack of formal guarantee of productivity offsets typical of many
incentive contracts (see Basheda et al., 2001) and is not at all restrictive. Indeed,
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under commitment, whether or not contractibility is assumed, not only the main
results continue to hold but also a bargaining inefficiency arises (see Laffont and
Tirole, 1993, ch. 1). 17

Benevolent Planners
Before learning  , the firm commits a monetary investment of cost I  0
which increases the ex ante probability of being a high type to v  I   v 1    I  .18
A higher I makes it more likely that the firm is efficient. I also assume that the
cost-reducing technology is efficient enough, exhibits decreasing returns and does
not exclude a  realization. This means that    1  v  ,    0 , limI I    I    ,
1
I   1  v    , v    v  . In the investment regime (notice the index I ), the firm

chooses Iˆ to maximize expected ex post rents minus investment costs:



   

Iˆ  arg max I 0 v  I  1    i, j   aˆ S , I Iˆ  I .

7

The firm under-invests with respect to the social optimum (see the
Appendix) and a decrease in the power of the incentive rule depresses expected ex
post rents. Thus, a benevolent planner should select higher-powered schemes if
investment decisions are sufficiently relevant. Formally, I shall assume that the
firm’s utility enters the planners’ objective function with an extra weight  with
17

Even if the used and useful US doctrine constitutes a partial assurance against non-commitment,

the assumption is the more appropriate in technologically mature and mass markets such as
electricity, where a firm retaliation strategy could not be very damaging (Newbery, 2000, ch. 2).
18

Investment shortages also have a negative effect on service reliability and quality, and Basheda

et al. (2001) suggest that the restructuring-related investment uncertainties and the reduced
availability of hydroelectric generation were two of the main causes of California’s liberalization
failures.
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    0 so that expected welfare rewrites as W S , I v  Iˆ    v  Iˆ  1    i, j    a S , I  

   , where the dependence on the expected probability of a high type is

W S v Iˆ

made explicit. The low type’s contract is now pinned down by
   aˆ S , I   qˆ S , I 

   1   i, j    aˆ  ,


 v Iˆ
1 

S ,I

and by the first order condition to  7  . Fixed-price contracts reach efficiency but
leave a disproportionate rent to the firm. Therefore, optimal rules trade off
between static (rent extraction) and long-run (investment inducement) concerns.
PROPOSITION 2: The power of the optimal incentive scheme rises with the
planners’ investment concerns  .
The result is similar to the one obtained by Sappington (1986), who claims
that institutions preventing the regulator from observing the firm’s costs are
optimal if the expropriation of investments is a real issue. Even if cost-reduction
is undoubtedly in interest of society, quality and reliability-enhancing investments
can affect consumers asymmetrically if only some of them are also shareholders.
Next, I prove that incentive rules reflect this conflict if the planner is a political
party accountable to her constituency, and re-election is uncertain.

Partisan Planners
Suppose that the incentive rule is selected in stage 2 by the incumbent
between two parties: the pro-shareholder R and the pro-consumer D . Next and
before the firm eventually commits to the investment (which happens after stage
5), an election with exogenous winning probability xm  m  D, R  is held. The
winner can, exerting effort  m , ease the firm’s private-funds-seeking activity. The
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investment monetary cost is I  0 , and its stochastic return has expected value
     1     0 ,   0   ,   0 .

19

The firm is infinitively risk averse in

the range of the ex-post negative utilities. Thus, only the high type invest if

 

8

 aˆmS , I   I  0 ,

where m  D, R indexes the incumbent party.20 Each party attaches to the ex-post
participation–to the investment game–constraint  8 both the common shadow
price 1    1 and a specific investment concern  m capturing the party’s
willingness to leave higher ex post rents to shareholders. Let me label D xD  R xR
 x . I assume the following restrictions on the exogenous parameters:

A2:  R   D  1 ;  R  1      1       D ;   0 ; x    .
Therefore, the incumbent maximizes:
 1    i, j    amS , I  .
WmS , I  W S  1    m  xv

In interpreting the foregoing, several observations should be borne in
mind. First, the non-monetary nature of  m simplifies the analysis assuring that
the ex post participation constraint enters the expected welfare without the
shadow price of public funds. Second, the restriction according to which the
winning party cannot reform incentive rules squares with the typical commitment
period common to almost all PBR contracts (Basheda et al., 2001). Third, the fact
19

The set up matches the stylized fact that incentive regulation “can also be designed to encourage

other goals, such as maintaining or improving service quality and encouraging certain investments
(e.g., network modernization or energy efficiency investments)” (Basheda et al., 2001).
20

The latter is the case even if perfect financial markets are available, provided that  I 

 

 aˆmS , I  mˆ  1 .

If the aid is monetary, the analysis continue to hold under the assumption that party

R dislikes more resorting to distortionary taxes in order to finance the aid (see Guerriero, 2008).
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that the pro-shareholder party exerts a higher investment-enhancing effort and
dislikes less leaving an extra ex post rent to the firm is in the spirit of those
models of electoral competition in which candidates commit to well-defined
policies ahead of elections and then stick to them (for a review see Persson and
Tabellini, 2000, ch. 3). Fourth, the last two restrictions in A2 assure that the other
propositions continue to hold. All in all, the equilibrium low type’s allocation is
1     m
 
   aˆmS , I   qˆmS , I    v  1    i, j   

1


1 



x   aˆmS , I ,






9

which, in turn, implies (see the Appendix) that:
PROPOSITION 3: Under A2, the power of the optimal scheme rises with the
incumbent grip on power xm and is greater if the reformer is pro-shareholder.
While the second part of Proposition 3 is in tune with Laffont (1996), the
first one differs from the conclusion of this seminal paper. There the relation
between the likelihood of a reform toward more powerful rules and the hold on
power of the incumbent is negative when the reformer is pro-shareholder party
and null otherwise. The actual pattern originates from both the asymmetry in the
parties’ preferences and the uncertainty of elections and is similar to the strategic
dynamic incentive pointed out by a long tradition of political economy (Persson
and Svensson, 1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990; Hanssen, 2004).
This body of research claims that a lack of permanence in office can
inspire policymakers to implement reforms either to influence political outcomes
or to limit the actions of future incumbents.21 In a similar way in the present
environment, even if both parties value profit-enhancing investments, only the

21

For instance, the reform was promoted in Maine by Republicans who had defeated Democrats a

few years earlier. The latter won back the state after the adoption of PBR (Lee and Hill, 1995).
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pro-shareholder one prefers investment inducement to shareholder exploitation.22
An increase in the probability of being re-elected and exerting more (less) effort,
without the danger of facing a new institutional reform, pushes party R ( D ) to
select more powerful rules and so assure an even higher profit to her constituency
(curb allocative distortion). Provided that A1 and A2 hold, and with P and 
held constant, the above propositions can be restated as testable predictions on
regulated prices and the likelihood of reforms toward PBR as:
TESTABLE PREDICTIONS: The likelihood of a reform toward higher powered
incentive rules will (1) increase (decrease) with the strength of fairness (revolving
door) motivations, rise if supervisors are elected, (2) rise with the efficiency of the
information-gathering technology and society’s investment concerns, (3) increase
with the incumbent’s grip on power and if the reformer is Republican. (4) More
powerful incentive rules will lower regulated prices.
In what follows, I test these testable predictions, tackling first predictions 1 to 3,
and then turn to the fourth one

4. Evidence
Between 1982 and 2002, twenty-five US states have experimented some
form of broadly defined PBR (a firm-by-firm breakdown is available from the
author). This variation constitutes a perfect source for a panel analysis. I consider
forty-six states for which data on incentive rules, rates, average costs and proxies
22

The prediction is similar to those obtained by the Alesina and Tabellini’s (1990) analysis of

budget deficits and by the Hanssen’s (2004) study of endogenous judicial institutions. Yet PBR
not only limits the options of successors (as do fiscal deficits and appointed courts) but it also ties
the incumbent’s hands later, when electoral promises need to be met.
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for the determinants of incentive rules are available (see the Appendix). From
1996, a wide deregulation and competition-enhancing process which came into
force with one or two-year lags, has interested the market. This restructuring
wave has altered the strategic environment dramatically (for a theoretical
explanation see Laffont and Tirole, 1993, ch. 17). An inference unable to
disentangle the fine details of the reforms can be highly misleading. Thus, I
consider the 1982-1997 period only.23
During these years, three alternatives to cost of service have been used:
price cap, earnings sharing and rate case moratoria. While the latter constitute
agreements to freeze the firm’s rates during a commitment period, earnings
sharing requires the firm to share incremental earnings above and below an
intermediate range with its users. Therefore, when earnings are in between these
bounds, the firm secures greater profit if a higher cost-reducement effort is
exerted. Under price cap the firm acts as residual claimant of its performance and
can adjust its rates as long as, on average, prices rise no faster than inflation less a
productivity offset. So price cap is the most powerful rule, cost of service the least
powerful and the others lie in between the two extremes.

Non Random Incentive Rules Selection
Once a comparable sample of institutions that vary in their effects on
incentive power has been identified, to evaluate the model’s predictions, proxies
for both the determinants of incentive rules and a suitable strategy are needed. In
order to fully exploit the three-dimensional variation (over time, across states and
23

Adding restructuring dummies or considering a sample with one or two more (less) years does

not affect the empirical results in any appreciable way.
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across power levels) in incentive schemes, I estimate two models. Both models
aim at explaining the probability of reforms toward more powerful rules.24
Empirical strategy.–– The first model is the following ordered logit:
yi ,t  k if  k 1  yi*,t   k for yi*,t   zit   it and k  1, 2 ,

which can be expressed in terms of the conditional distribution of yi ,t given zit as





Pr yi ,t  k zi ,t    k   zit     k 1   zit  ,

where  k are the unknown threshold parameters,  is the logit function and yi ,t
(PBR_O hereafter) equals one if state i uses cost of service regulation in year t ,
three if it uses price cap and two if it uses one of the other two procedures.25 The
second model is the following exponential proportional hazard rate model:
 t , zit   exp   zit  t

where t is the baseline hazard and  t , zit  is the instantaneous probability of
reforming from cost of service to PBR in year t and state i (that is, the failure
event is identified by PBR, which is equal to 1 if at least one firm in the state i
adopts price cap, rate case moratoria or earnings sharing, and 0 otherwise).26 zit
collects the eventually time-varying proxies for the efficiency of the information24

The embraced empirical strategy is also driven by the lack of within variation in many controls;

yet, the coefficients attached to the time-varying covariates are qualitatively similar when a fixed
effects logit is run. Finally, clustering the standard errors does not affect the analysis significantly.
25

The nonlinearity of the right hand side of  9  does not exclude a role for interacted regressors. If

I estimate a logit model with dependent PBR and interaction terms, these are usually not
significant at a probability of the reform level of 0 and 0.5 (see Ai and Norton, 2003).
26

If I use the single IOUs within a state as the cross sectional identifiers, none of the results is

affected. Similarly, switching to an ordered probit, imposing a different duration distribution or
running a logit (or probit) model with dependent variable PBR does not change the main message.
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gathering technology, society’s investment concerns, the strength of supervisors’
implicit incentives and intrinsic motivations, and the incumbent’s grip on power.
Measuring the structural determinants of incentive rules.–– Let me start from the
first prediction. Supervisors’ implicit incentives can reasonably be captured by
two indicators: an elected regulators (Reg_Elec) dummy and an elected judges
(Jud_Elec) binary. I also consider whether appointed commissioners cannot all be
from the same party (Bipartisan). The latter proxies for a less relevant Besley and
Coate’s (2003) bundling effect, being linked to less pro-shareholder appointed
regulators.27 As a result, the prior is that Bipartisan should display a sign similar
to Reg_Elec. A more challenging task is to find meaningful proxies for intrinsic
motivations. My choice is to follow Teske et al. (2004, ch.4) and use, as a proxy
for less powerful revolving door motivations, a binary variable equal to one if the
PUC imposes restrictions on how long, after service, a commissioner must wait
before taking a job in the industry (Rev_Door) and zero otherwise. Concerning
judges’ fairness motivations, a broad literature on judicial independence (for
references see Hanssen, 2004) claims that the length of judicial term increases the
judges’ insulation diluting their reputational concerns. So I consider the length of
judicial term (Jud_Term) as a proxy for less powerful fairness motivations.
Focusing on the second prediction, it is reasonable to assume that more
abundant resources and more powerful consumer groups ease information
gathering. So I add to the other controls the total budget (in thousands of dollars)
available to the PUC’s staff (Budget). I also add a proxy for the power of the
27

Besley and Coate (2003) prove that, because regulation is bundled with more salient policies

(like public spending), politicians have electoral incentives (and no electoral costs) to appoint a
pro-shareholders regulator.
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industrial users’ watchdog group. The latter is the share of revenues from sales to
industrial customers (Industrial). However, the utilities themselves fight in the
regulatory arena. Following Steiner (2004), a reasonable proxy for the industry
influence is the share of generation from nuclear sources (Gen_Nucl). Indeed,
nuclear plants require a large investment, which is typically undertaken by huge
utilities: thus, the nuclear share is correlated with the influence of large producers.
I also need proxies for society’s investment concerns. Here, my strategy is to
assume that higher residential rates increase society’s interest in cost-reducing
investments (for a similar approach see Steiner, 2004). Accordingly, I include the
residential price–defined in terms of revenue (in cents per Kwh) from electricity
sales–lagged two periods (Price_R(-2)). A proxy for the reformer’s constituency
ideology is required as well. A broad consensus (see Ka and Teske, 2002 and
Teske et al., 2004) holds that the Republican Party has been supported historically
by shareholders lobbies. This suggests that a time dummy for the years in which
both houses were under the control of the Republicans (Rep) can be used to
control for more pro-shareholders sentiments of the incumbent.
Turning to the third prediction, I follow Hanssen (2004), and I employ the
share of seats held by the majority party averaged across upper and lower houses
(Majority) as a proxy for how strong the incumbent’s hold on power is.
Finally, scholars of policy innovation (see, for example, Ka and Teske,
2002) claim that the diffusion pattern of a new policy displays learning features:
after one state has adopted a new policy, surrounding states are more likely to
follow suit. So I use the share of surrounding states adopting PBR (PBR_Nei).
Variables descriptions, means and standard errors are provided in Table 1.
The Appendix reports variables sources and construction and column 1 (2) of
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Table 2 lists the estimated marginal effects (hazard ratios) of the ordered logit
(proportional hazard rate) model.28
Empirical results.–– Looking at column 1, the results are consistent with the
model’s predictions. Starting with the first one, supervisors’ implicit incentives
(Reg_Elec and Jud_Elec) and the firm’s explicit incentives display strategic
complementarities, and a reform from appointed to elected commissioners implies
an increase in the ordered log-odds of adopting a more powerful scheme of 2.033
points. Besides, the regulatory appointment rule seems to be more relevant than
the judicial one. Bipartisan has the correct sign but it is not significant at the
standard level. For what, instead, concerns intrinsic incentives, the results are
mixed. Even if the sign of the coefficient attached to Jud_Term has the right sign
and it is marginally (at 30 percent) significant, Rev_Door displays the wrong sign
and it is significantly correlated with PBR_O. This surprising result is similar to
the one reported in Ka and Teske (2002) and may occur because the analysis
considers only the “exit” phase of the revolving door.
Turning to the second prediction, higher values of Budget increase the
ordered log-odds of adopting more powerful schemes, and the relative coefficient
is significant at 1 percent. The behavior of Industrial, however, is unexpected.
This result could be driven by the fact that the watchdog groups’ special interests
can deteriorate in spite of ameliorating the quality of the information-gathering
technology. Also, Gen_Nucl is not relevant in explaining the dependent variable:
this confirming that, whenever implicit incentives and intrinsic motivations are
28

Gen_Nucl together with Industrial and Budget are conditionally independent because they are

either set in advance or driven by the cost structure captured by Price_R(-2). Including income per
capita, population, proportion of young and old and regional dummies does not affect the results.
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sufficiently strong, industry’s special interests have no voice at the Constitutional
table. Turning to the efficiency of the generation technology, a one-standarddeviation (2.082) increase in Price_R(-2) (whose coefficient is significant at 1
percent) raises the ordered log-odds of adopting more powerful rules by a little
more than 1.46 points. For what concerns Rep, even if the attached coefficient
displays the correct sign the covariate is not statistically significant.
Turning to the predictions concerning the strategic dynamics incentives,
the estimated effects confirm that more powerful schemes are found where the
political competition is less tight. In point of fact, Majority shows a positive
coefficient significant at 20 percent. Finally, as expected, PBR_Nei increases the
ordered log-odds of adopting higher powered rules.
Column 2 of Table 2 considers as dependent variable the hazard of PBR
adoption. Again the empirical results are consistent with the model’s predictions.
This time the commissioners’ selection rule, the PUC budget and the lagged
residential price are the most powerful in explaining the instantaneous probability
of reforms.29 All in all, observed institutions seem to reflect both efficiency and
forward-looking concerns. This non random assignment of reforms to US states
not only confirms the model’s ideas but also implies that the effect of incentive
rules on performance can be assessed correctly only when these institutions are
treated as endogenous: I perform this empirical exercise in the next section.

29

The reported figures are hazard ratios, and a coefficient greater than 1 implies higher odds that

an individual in the treatment group implements the reform before an individual in the control
group. Thus, for instance, a state selected at random from the group of states electing their PUC
commissioners has an 80.9 percent (= 4.23/(4.23+1)) higher probability of implementing the
reform before a state selected at random from the group of states appointing their commissioners.
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Regulatory Performance and Endogenous Incentive Rules
States may well self select into PBR on the bases of unobserved political
and technological shocks fostering society’s investment concerns, as well as of a
basic strain in making acceptable to users the need for investments. If the
variation in incentive regulation used to explain prices is related to these
unexplained determinants of performance, the OLS estimator becomes biased.
Empirical methodology.–– Thus, in order to assess correctly the effect of PBR, I
estimate the following dynamic panel model, employing a GMM estimator:

10 

yi ,t  i  t   yi ,t 1   PBRi ,t   X i ,t   i ,t .

yis,t is a price in state i and year t for customer class s . The classes considered

are: residential (Price_R), commercial (Price_C) and industrial (Price_I). yi ,t 1
represents a lagged performance term and picks up the persistence in the pricing
process.30 X i ,t is a vector of time-varying factors likely to influence regulation.
X i ,t gathers the determinants of incentive regulation discussed above (Reg_Elec,

Jud_Elec, Majority, Budget, Industrial, Gen_Nucl, Rep), a fossil fuels costs index
(c) devised by Besley and Coate (2003), state population (Pop), share of
population aged between five and seventeen (Young) and sixty-five and over
(Old), and state income per capita in dollars (GSP). Even after controlling for all
these factors, some relevant systematic variation inevitably remains. I introduce
both state ( i ) and time ( t ) dummies. While the former captures time-invariant
30

Friedman (1991) claims that past prices constitute crucial benchmarks for the PUC staff (see Ai

and Sappington, 2002). The temporal structure implicit in the estimated model is not general. The
effects of incentive rules may not materialize until several years after implementation. Replacing
PBR with its counterparts lagged one year produces results similar to the findings reported below.
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features of the regulated environment such as state laws and long-run differences
in production systems, the latter pick up macro-shocks such as interest rates
shocks, changes in federal policies and industry wide technological advances.
Incentive rules are captured by PBR. In order to avoid small sample issues, the
data now span the 1980-1997 period.
The estimated model has two endogenous variables. One is PBR and the
other is yi ,t 1 , which, even if uncorrelated with the current error terms, is
correlated with past errors and, in turn, with the de-meaned residual  i ,t   i .
Therefore, I need at least two instruments exogenous to the process in equation

10  . Following Steiner (2004), these two excluded instruments are PBR_Nei and
the dependent lagged two periods.31
For what concerns the latter, state by state partial autocorrelation functions
suggest that the prices are autoregressive of order one: this assures that the
dependent lagged two periods is exogenous. The exogeneity of PBR_Nei, instead,
stands on the following argument: while the presence of low prices in reforming
neighbouring states could shift support for reform in state i , electricity rates do
not adjust until the reform is implemented in state i .32 Similar results are obtained
when I use a dummy equal to one if incentive regulation has been adopted by at

31

The first stage equations (not reported, except the first stage of column 1 of Table 3 which I list

in column 3 of Table 2) confirm that the instruments are correlated to the endogenous covariates.
Furthermore, the F-test on the excluded instruments in the PBR first stage, reported in Table 3, is
generally greater than 10 (the same holds true for other first stage equations not reported): this
reassures about a possible weak instrumentation (see Stock et al., 2002).
32

The model is exactly identified. If the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator is used, the results remain

robust and the over-identifying restrictions (coming from a richer lag structure) are not rejected.
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least one firm operating in the state telecommunications market in that year.
Empirical results.–– The basic results are given in Table 3. Columns 1 to 3 list the
coefficient of the endogenous covariates when the dependent variable is the
residential, commercial and industrial price, respectively.
The introduction of incentive regulation has a negative (positive) but
insignificant effect on industrial (commercial) ratepayers, and a positive and
significant at 20 percent marginal impact on residential users. The latter have
experienced a mean increase in price of 13.8 percentage points which confirms
the end of political cross-subsidies from business (industrial and commercial) to
residential users reported by previous empirical works (see, for instance,
Eckenrod, 2006). Finally, OLS–not shown–tend to over-estimate the coefficient
attached to PBR, as can reasonably be expected from the index model.

5. Concluding Remarks
The relevance of regulatory institutions to economic development is key,
especially in a period of deregulation and competition enhancing reforms. Yet, the
determinants of efficiency-enhancing contracts are essentially poorly understood:
in this paper, I developed and tested a model of endogenous pricing rules.
Given the technology environment and both the implicit incentives and the
intrinsic motivations of public officials, political reformers not only consider the
comparative advantages of different incentive schemes but they also use high
powered rules to tie the hands of rival parties when uncertain about re-election.
Consistent with the model’s main intuitions, the likelihood of reforms toward
higher powered rules has been linked to elected supervisors, institutional settings
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enhancing the fairness of judges, a stronger incumbent’s hold on power, more
abundant regulatory resources and a more expensive electricity generation. As a
result, my analysis delivers three pieces of advice for constitutional designers:
1. It is crucial to assess carefully the dynamic effects of more powerful
rules when expropriation of sunk investment is a real concern;
2. Before calibrating the power of the firm’s explicit incentives, the
efficiency of the information-gathering technology and the broad set of concerns
to which supervisors respond need to be considered attentively; and
3. The success of regulatory regime reforms is linked to a Constitutional
table insulated from short-term electoral boosts.
Even if several states have recently tried to enhance competition, US
electricity firms, along with other major utilities, are still regulated through
settings similar to those studied above. Moreover, very similar institutions have
recently been exported beyond American boundaries as an answer to the rising
demand for a more effective judicial review and for a greater transparency of the
regulatory process (see Newbery, 2000, ch. 2).33 This institutional trend makes the
US lesson an increasingly relevant case study, especially useful for the future
harmonization of European regulated markets.34
33

Remarkably, the Competition Act of 1998 and the Utilities Act of 2000 reformed the UK gas

and electricity market institutions introducing a top-level board of three officials (GEMA)
appointed by the Secretary of State and supported by an independent staff (Ofgem). The latter
proposes the policy position and is subject to a strict transparency requirement which, in turn,
“provides the hook for judicial review” (OECD, 2002).
34

As stressed by Breyer (2003) and Motta (2004), several recent antitrust cases (for example,

Ahlstrom v. European Commission, 1993 and Enel v.Wind-Infostrada, 2002) have focused the
interest of several European countries on the “gate-keeper” role of administrative judges.
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6. Appendix
Equilibrium under Perfect Information
Under perfect information, the planner knows  and infers a from the observation of c .
Maximizing  2  with respect to a , U and q , the first best prescribes that:
1. The disutility of effort is equalized to the cost reduction at the margin:
   a*   q* ;

 A1

2. Given the existence of the shadow cost of rewards, no rent is left to the firm:
U 0

or

t *    a*  ;

3. The social marginal value of output and its marginal cost are equalized:
V   q*   1       a* 

or

S   q*   p*  c .

A fixed price contract on the managerial reward t gives the firm the right incentives for
cost reduction. Label T    a*  and C *     a*  q* , equilibrium managerial rewards are
t *  C *   T   C  q   C *  . The planner tailors the fixed charge T to fully extract the firm’s

rent, and the firm, which is left as the residual claimant of its cost savings, maximizes
T      a  q  C *    a  and, consequently, chooses the optimal a .

■

Proof of Lemma
I shall start from the equilibrium efforts prevailing when supervisors are elected. To this
extent, maximizing RE ,l  eE ,l , S  with respect to eE ,l with eEexp,l taken as given and, then,
imposing the equilibrium condition eˆE ,l  eEexp,l , the equilibrium is implicitly defined by
LHS  eˆE ,l   1  SR  f    eˆE ,l  1  1  S  J  1  K  C   eˆE ,l   0

 A2 

and by the slackness  eˆE ,l  1 LHS  eˆE ,l   0 and eˆE ,l LHS  eˆE ,l   0 . In the eˆE ,l , RE ,l  eE ,l , S 
space, the first term in LHS  eˆE ,l  is a rectangular hyperbola centred on  0, 0  while the

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper193

40

Guerriero: The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Ev

second term is an increasing function. This, along with the fact that C   0    and
limei ,l 1 C   ei ,l    , assures that eˆE ,l exists and is both interior and unique. Turning to

appointed supervisors and following the treatment in Dewatripont et al. (1999),
equilibrium efforts are implicitly defined by the following first order condition

1  SR  E 



feA,l  A,l eˆA,l

 f 

A,l



eˆA,l   1  1  S  J  1  K  C   eˆA,l  .


 A3

Again  A3 holds as an equality (and thus the slackness conditions are always met). The
marginal density of the observable conditional on effort f  A,l eˆA,l  is proportional to
exp    A,l   eA,l 


2



2 eAexp,l  

 
2

if f is the truncated normal and equal to eˆA,l f   if f is

one of the other distributions in the relevant class; so from the equilibrium condition



eˆA,l  eAexp,l follows that E  feA,l  A,l eˆA,l


1  SR 

 f 

A,l



eˆA,l    eˆA,l and  A3 rewrites as


eˆA,l  1  1  S  J  1  K  C   eˆA,l  .

 A4 

 A2  and  A4  clarifies that: 1. Elected supervisors exert strictly greater effort than
appointed ones if f    1 (which is always true under A1); 2. Supervisors’ objective
functions are strictly concave and the following three global comparative statics apply:
eˆi , R R  0 , eˆ j , J J  0, j , eˆi ,l K  0, eˆ j ,l K  0i, j, l .

■

Underinvestment When the Planner Cannot Commit
The socially optimal I minimizes the sum of investment costs and ex post costs





I *  arg min I 0 I  v 1    I     1  v 1    I    .

 A5

This amounts to saying that the objective in  A5 assumes a value greater at Iˆ than at

I * ; the same can be said for the objective function in  7  . As a result, it follows that



 



 

  

Iˆ    v 1   Iˆ   v 1   Iˆ 1    i, j   aˆ S , I Iˆ  Iˆ 
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I *    v 1    I *    v 1    I *  1    i, j   aˆ S , I Iˆ  I * 

   1   i, j    aˆ  Iˆ  0 .



v   I *    Iˆ

 A6 

S ,I

Given that    1  v  ,    0 and limI I    I    , the solutions to  A5 and  7  are
interior (so that the slackness conditions are always met) and such that

    1 v   Iˆ    1 v   I  ;

1    i, j   aˆ S , I Iˆ

*

 A7 

where I have imposed the first order conditions and used, once again, the fact that
   1  v  . Clearly  A7  implies that    I *      Iˆ   I *  Iˆ (by the concavity of the
 function). Withal, also  A6  is met.

■

Proof of Proposition 3
Applying the implicit function theorem to  9  it follows that aˆmS , I  m  0 (which
proves the second part of Proposition 3 being  R  1       D  1     ) and that





sign aˆmS , I xm  sign x 1     m  xm  .

As a result, the following two derivatives conclude the proof:
x 1     R  xR     R   D      D   R   x 1     D  xD  0 .

■

Data
The data set gathers observations for 46 states over the period 1980-1997. Only a few
data points are available for the District of Columbia and no data on PBR are available
for Alaska, Utah and Wyoming. No major IOUs serves Nebraska. Variables sources are:
1. Data on incentive schemes are collected directly from: A. Basheda et al. (2001); B.
EEI. Performance Based Regulation: EEI Member Survey, mimeo, EEI, 2000.
2. Data on sales, revenue, generation shares and the price of fossil fuels (composite) per
net Kwh are collected or calculated from the EEI (Edison Electric Institute) yearbook:
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A. EEI. 1960 – 1992: Historical Statistics of the Electric Utility Industry. Washington,
DC: EEI, 1995. B. EEI, (1993-1997). Statistical Yearbook of the Electric Utility Industry.
Washington, DC: EEI.
EEI refers to the source of data for its yearbooks to various places including DOE, EIA,
Federal Power Commission and FERC. EEI reports annual revenues (in dollar terms) and
sales (in Kwh) by state and class of service. Residential, commercial and industrial users
account for the 95 percent of revenues. EEI reports electric generation and sources of
energy for generation in two types of breakdown, i.e., by type of prime mover driving the
generator and by energy source. The totals from the two of them are consistent. I used the
second one, except for generation by hydro (see also Besley and Coate, 2003). Prices are
calculated from the revenues and sales in terms of cents per Kwh.
3. Political preferences are from the CSG (Council of State Governments) yearbooks:
CSG, (1982-1997). The Book of the States. CSG, Lexington, KY.
4. Data on regulatory selection rules, revolving door restrictions on commissioners,
bipartisanship requirements, and total budget are collected from: A. PUCs’ web pages;
B. NARUC, (1982-1997). Yearbook of Regulatory Agencies. NARUC, Washington DC.
5. Data on judicial selection rules and length terms are collected from:
A. Hanssen, F. A. “Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the
State Courts.” Journal of Legal Studies, 33 (2004): 431-474, table 1.
B. Besley, T., and Payne, A. “Implementation of Anti-Discrimination Policy: Does
Judicial Selection Matter?” Working Papers, LSE, 2005, table 1.
6. In order to construct the fossil fuel cost index, let sijt and qijt be, respectively, the share
and price of input j (coal, gas and oil) used in state i and year t . So, if pit   j qijt pijt qit
is the average price of fossil fuels (composite) per net Kwh for state i in year t , then the
cost index is defined as cit  sit pit .
7. State income per capita, population, proportion aged over 65 and proportion aged 5–17
are calculated from a US Census Bureau (UCB) publication:
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UCB, (1980-1997). Population Estimates Program. Washington, DC: UCB.
8. State income per capita is collected directly from a UCB publication:
UCB, (1980-1997). Statistical Abstract of the United States. Washington, DC: UCB.

Tables
Table 1: Variable Names and Descriptions
Variables

Incentive
schemes:

Supervisors’
implicit
incentives:
Supervisors’
intrinsic
motivations:
Political
competition:
Supervision
technology:
Interest
groups:

PBR:
PBR_O:

Description
Dummy taking value 1 if in the state a PBR contract is in use; 0
otherwise.
Dummy taking value 3 if in the state a price cap contract is in use; 1 if
cost of service is employed and 2 otherwise.

Reg_Elec:

Dummy taking value 1 if commissioners are elected; 0 otherwise.

Bipartisan:

Dummy taking value 1 if appointed commissioners cannot all be from
the same party; 0 otherwise.

Jud_Elec:

Dummy taking value 1 if High Court judges are elected; 0 otherwise.

Rev_Door:

Dummy equal 1 if there is a time restriction on commissioners working
for the regulated industry once they have left the PUC; 0 otherwise.

Jud_Term:

Length of High Court judges’ term in years.

Majority:

Percentage of seats (averaged across upper and lower houses) held by
the majority party.

Budget:

PUC’s total receipts in thousands of dollars.

Industrial:

Percentage of revenue from sales to customers that are industrial.

Gen_Nucl:

Percentage of total generation from nuclear sources.

Price_R:

Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to residential users.

Price_R(-2): Price_R lagged two years.
Prices:

Average
costs:
Investment
concerns:

Other
controls:

Price_C:

Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to commercial users.

Price_I:

Revenue (cents per Kwh) from sales to industrial users.

c:

Cost of fossil fuels (in cents per Kwh).

Rep:

Dummy taking value 1 if both houses are controlled (with the absolute
majority of seats) by the Republican party; 0 otherwise.

PBR_Nei:

Share of neighbouring states using PBR.

Pop:

State population.

Old:

Percentage of population aged 65 and over.

Young:

Percentage of population aged 5–17.

GSP:

Gross state product per capita in dollars.

Mean
[Standard
Deviation]
0.080
[0.272]
1.115
[0.416]
0.217
[0.413]
0.217
[0.413]
0.482
[0.500]
0.652
[0.477]
8.761
[3.082]
0.651
[0.118]
18382.94
[34828.78]
0.292
[0.087]
0.194
[0.211]
7.595
[2.109]
7.241
[2.082]
6.897
[1.803]
4.918
[1.526]
1.233
[0.940]
0.365
[0.482]
0.075
[0.150]
5,318,228
[5,476,011]
0.126
[0.017]
0.188
[0.015]
15975.28
[5369.74]
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Table 2: Non Random Incentive Schemes Selection
(1)

Reg_Elec
Bipartisan
Jud_Elec
Rev_Door
Jud_Term
Majority
Budget
Industrial
Gen_Nucl
Price_R(-2)
Rep
PBR_Nei

(2)
Dependent Variable
PBR
4.230
[2.852]**
0.994
[0.682]
1.102
[0.822]
0.908
[0.557]
1.049
[0.088]
14.022
[46.512]
1.00002
[4.03e-06]***
0.001
[0.004]*
0.312
[0.562]
1.370
[0.217]**
0.573
[0.353]
18.811
[27.334]**

PBR_O
2.033
[0.402]***
– 0.482
[0.514]
0.566
[0.357]†
– 0.851
[0.334]**
– 0.060
[0.057]
1.904
[1.481]†
0.00002
[4.69e-06]***
– 3.305
[2.539]†
– 0.219
[1.004]
0.703
[0.128]***
0.035
[0.354]
1.360
[1.038]†

(3)
PBR
– 0.036
[0.103]

0.144
[0.075]*

– 0.155
[0.130]
1.97e-06
[4.32e-07]***
0.422
[0.249]*
– 0.171
[0.096]*
0.059
[0.009]***
– 0.028
[0.018]†
– 0.307
[0.082]***
c, Pop, Young, Old, GSP.
Fixed state and time effects.

Other Controls
Estimation
Ordered logit.
Exponential survival.
Log Likelihood
- 24.169
Log Pseudolikelihood
- 187.493
R2 (within)
0.32
Pseudo R2
0.24
Number of Observations
736
692
736
Notes: 1. Robust standard errors (z distribution) in columns (1) and (2) parentheses; standard errors in column (3) parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; †, 20%;
3. The entries in column (2) are hazard ratio estimates.

Table 3: Effects of PBR on Regulated Rates
(1)

(2)
(3)
Dependent Variable
Price_R
Price_C
Price_I
0.950
0.585
- 0.166
PBR
[0.665]†
[0.604]
[0.538]
Lagged Dependent
0.689
0.672
0.661
Variable
[0.059]***
[0.058]***
[0.064]***
Other Controls
Reg_Elec, Jud_Elec, Majority, Budget, Industrial, Gen_Nucl, Rep, c, Pop, Young, Old, GSP.
Instruments
Other controls, Dependent var. lagged two periods, PBR_Nei.
Endogenous
PBR, Lagged dependent var.
Estimation
Fixed state and time effects system GMM estimator.
F_Test
27.48***
23.23***
18.43***
R2 (within)
0.82
0.70
0.56
Number of observations
736
736
736
Notes: 1. Standard errors in parentheses;
2. *** denotes significant at the 1% confidence level; **, 5%; *, 10%; †, 20%;
3. F_Test refers to the joint significance of Dependent Var. lagged two periods and PBR_Nei in the PBR first stage.
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